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Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to identify the class of dynamic labor 
market models (based on job search theory) which justify the empirical 
procedures used in the vast majority of recent studies on labor market 
flows. It will be shown that this class of models is much smaller than is 
usually thought to be the case. A particularly interesting example is that 
job search theory without major (not yet accomplished) revisions, cannot be 
1
used to justify an increasing hazard rate in unemployment. 
There is now a vast number of studies which have empirically 
investigated labor market flows. A large majority of these studies have 
confined their efforts to considering the determinants of the flow of 
workers from unemployment to employment [see, for example Nickell (1979a), 
Kiefer and Neumann (1979), Lancaster (1980)]. A much smaller number of 
studies have investigated the flow from employment to unemployment [see, for 
exam~le Jovanovic and Mincer (1980)]. More recently, a number of studies 
have investigated the flows between two states (employment and unemployment) 
or between three states (employment, unemployment and out of the labor 
force) simultaneously [see, for example, Burdett et al. (1980, 1984, 1985), 
Flinn and Heckman (1982a,b), Tuma and Robins (1980), Toikka (1976)]. 
y lIn the simple job search model where the unemployed individqal< 
receives unemployment insurance payments for a fixed (finite) number of 
consecutive periods, the reservation wage declines with duration. Assuming 
that the arrival rate of job offers and the distribution of potential offers 
are not affected by the duration of unemployment, gives an increasing hazard 
rate in unemployment. If, however, the arrival rate and distribution of 
potential wage offers are adversely affected the hazard rate could increase 
or decrease with the duration of a spell. 
2 
Most of these studies have used what will be termed a two-state (or 
2three-state) "Markovian" approach. The "Markovian" approach assumes only 
that the fixed characteristics of a worker (such as education, race, sex, date 
of birth, etc.) and possibly the worker's duration in the state currently 
occupied influence the probability of leaving the state in a given period of 
time. The individual's labor market history is assumed to play no role. 
There appear to be three major reasons for this "Markovian" approach. 
The first is a practical one. To include a significant number of aspects of 
a worker's labor market history would increase the number of "right-hand­
side" variables and thus reduce the power of any empirical work. Second, 
given some elements of a worker's labor market history are included it is 
difficult to know where to stop. Should the wages earned in the last two 
jobs held by the worker be included but not the last three? To what extent 
3
should the timing and lengths of past unemployment spells be included? 
Third, the vast majority of empirical studies in this area have cited Job 
search theory as justification of· the procedure used and most studies on job 
search do not include such elements as a worker's previous experience. 
It should be stressed that not all empirical studies have cited job 
search to rationalize the estimation procedure used. Some have been agnostic 
about the theory; some have mentioned other theories that can be used to 
rationalize the empirical analysis. For example, job matching the~ies can 
be used for studying labor turnover [see, Jovanovic (1979. 1984)] . 
.. 2Ye devel.op a two-state model but it can be easily generalizep to a 

larger state space. 

3In addition to "Markovian" state dependence and duration dependence, 
Heckman and Borjas (1980) consider occurrence dependence and lagged duration 
dependence. Their paper is concerned with the development of statistical 
techniques for testing for the presence of different types of state 
dependence. 
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Nevertheless, job search theory has provided the theoretical centerstone of 
much work on labor market flows. More importantly, though search theory is 
often utilized to justify the "Markovian" approach, very few studies have 
formally derived a model so that s~uctural interpretations can be made. 
It is now well-known that, within the job search framework usually 
considered, the optimal strategy of an unemployed worker can be character­
ized by a reservation wage R(t), where t indicates the time since last 
employed. A wage offer at unemployment duration t is accepted if and only 
if it is at least as great as R(t). Given a stationary environment, it can 
be shown that R(t) is a constant for all t. This implies the hazard from 
unemployment is a constant, i.e., the distribution of completed spells of 
unemployment is exponential [see McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970)]. Further, 
if, in addition, job separation in a given time interval is independent -of 
the duration of employment, than an individual's labor market history can be 
described by a two-state Markov process. 
Many have argued that the reservation wage of an individual does change 
with the duration of a spell of unemployment. Burdett (1979), for example, 
models argue that the hazard rate in unemployment decreases with duration. 
assumes unemployment insurance payments decline with the duration of a spell 
4
of unemployment. If the reservation wage declines with unemployment, 
ceteris paribus, the hazard rate out of unemployment increases. Other 
5 
4The reservation wage could decline for other reasons -- workers have 
finite lives [Gronau (1971)], liquidity constraints [Danforth (1979)] and 
learning of opportunities by a worker as he searches [Burdett and-YiShwanath 
(1988)]. 
5For example, see Vishwanath (1986), which uses a stigma or scarring 
effect to theoretically justify decreasing hazard. Empirical studies by 
Lancaster and Nickell (1982) and Flinn and Heckman (1982) find negative 
duration dependence in unemployment. 
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Thus, it has been argued that determining the sign of the hazard is an 
empirical matter. 
The above analysis is based on the (typically implicit) assumption that 
individuals only change state immediately after an event such as a job 
offer, or a layoff, but not necessarily after every event. We show that 
this 	assumption is restrictive. If the class of strategies is enlarged it 
not 	only increases the expected return but also 
(a) 	 the optimal strategy cannot be characterized by a single reservation 
wage, and 
(b) 	 implies the individual's labor market history cannot be described by a 
two-state (employment-unemployment) SMP, i.e., the individual's labor 
market history is important in this case. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section semi-Markov and 
Markov labor market histories are defined. In Section II a general labor 
market choice model is specified and the key restrictions identified. 
Sections III and IV deal with analyzing optimal strategies under different 
scenarios and the last section concludes. 
I. 	 Semi-Markov and Markov Labor Market Histories 
At any moment in time an individual who participates in a labor market 
can be envisaged to occupy one of two labor market states: employment 
(state 1) or unemployment (state 2). As time passes events occur (such as 
new job offers, layoffs, etc.) which imply the individual may choose (or be 
forced) to change state. The probability a given individual will,leave a 
state in a given period of time is a number of obvious interest to those who 
study labor market flows. Given such probabilities are well specified it is 
possible to construct the distribution of completed spells. 
i 
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Let Hi(ti;y,x,z,so) denote the probability a completed spell in state 
lasts no longer than time t. given
1 
(a) 	 y denotes the wage rate currently faced if employed; 
(b) 	 x is a vector describing the individual's labor market history in that 
it specifies when jobs were obtained in the past, when jobs were lost, 
the wage rate faced at each previous instant, etc. (but not y or 
t.) ;
1 
(c) 	 z is a vector describing the individual's fixed characteristics such 
as date of birth, sex, race, years of education, qualifications, etc.; 
(d) 	 s denotes the historical time state i was last entered. 
o 
Note that the distribution function H.(·) need not be a proper distribution 
1 
in that lim Hi(t.;y,x,z,s) < 1 if there is a positive probability thet i-+co 1 0 
individual will not leave state i, i - 1,2. The distribution functions 
specified above are very general and would be difficult (if not impossible) 
to estimate from any reasonable data set. To make these distribution 
functions more tractable to estimate, restrictions need to be imposed. Such 
practical considerations motivate the specifications to be made below. 
An individual's labor market history can be described by a two-state 
continuous time (homogeneous) semi-Markov process (SMP) if there exists a 
continuous distribution function G.(·;z), i - 1,2, such that 
1 
(1.1) 
for all ti' y, x, and s. Further, letting 
(1.2) 
when 	 (1.1) is satisfied, it follows that 
J.(t.;z) - G.(t.;z)/q.(z) 	 (1.3)
1 1 111 
6 
denotes the probability a completed spell in state i takes no longer than 
t , given the individual eventually leaves state i, i - 1,2. Note thati 
J.(e;z) is a proper conditional distribution function in that it limits to 
1 
1 as ti goes to infinity. Thus, given an individual's vector of fixed 
characteristics, z, his labor market history can be represented by a two-
state SMP only if the state currently occupied, and the duration of time in 
the current spell, are the only factors required to determine the probabil­
ity of changing state in a given period of time. Note, if the above 
restriction is satisfied many of the commonly used data sets on labor supply 
can be used to estimate labor market flows. 
An individual's labor market history can be described by a two-state 
continuous time (homogeneous) Markov process (MP) if (1) is satisfied with 
the added restriction that Ji(e;z) is an exponential distribution func­
tion. When this restriction is satisfied, the probability the individual 
changes state duri~ any particular time interval depends only on the state 
currently occupied given his vector of characteristics z. 
For many purposes it is more useful to consider the transition rate (or 
hazard rate) out of state i. The following expression: 
[Hi(ti+€;y,x,z,s) - Hi(ti;y,x,z,s)]/€ 
fli(t.;y,x,z,s ) lim ------------~------------------------------------------- (1.4)1 0 €~O [l-Hi(ti;y,x,z,s)] 
defines the transition rate out of state i, i - 1,2. Intuitively the 
transition rate out of state i is the "instantaneous probability" of 
leaving state- i given the duration of the completed spell in st~te· i is 
at least t .. 
1 
Note that the transition rate out of state i is a unique 
transformation of the distribution of completed spells in state i. Thus, 
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it can be shown that an individual's labor market history can be described 
by a two-state continuous time SMP if there exists TI.(·;z), i - 1,2, such 1 
that 
TI .(t . ;z) - IT.(t. ;y,x,z,s ) (1.5) 
1 1 110 
for all t i , y, x, z, and s . Further, a worker's labor market history o 
can be described by a two-state MP if it can be represented by a SMP where 
(1.6) 

for all ti ~ 0, i - 1,2. 
Much of the empirical work in this area has concentrated on how the 
transition rates out of each state change when individuals with different 
vectors of fixed characteristics are considered. Such problems are not 
addressed in the present study. Essentially, the thought experiment per­
formed here is to consider a large number of individuals with the same 
vector of fixed characteristics and to see what behavioral conditions are 
required for a two-state SMP to describe their histories. As z is assumed 
to be the same for all, it is suppressed in the notation developed. 
Nevertheless, we shall indicate where z is expected to play an important 
part in the story. 
II. Framework For Labor Market Choice 
Below a reasonably general model of job search with layoffs is 
presented. The objective is to develop a framework in which it is possible 
to investigate the conditions required for an individual's labor ~arket 
history to be described by a SMP or MP. 
The same notation will be used as in the previous section with one 
important exception. The wage faced by an individual, y, will now be 
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termed the base wage rate. The actual wage rate faced depends on the base 
wage rate and seniority, where seniority is defined as the time since last 
unemployed. Specifically, assume the actual wage paid to an employed worker 
at time t, since last unemployed. w(t'Yl) can be written as 
(2.1) 
where ~(.) is a bounded differentiable function with ~(O) - O. It should 
be noted that seniority, as defined, is transferred during job-to-job move­
ments but is lost as soon as the individual becomes unemployed. This is 
obviously restrictive as seniority is usually thought of as some function of 
the total time spent in employment. If, however, a worker's seniority is 
defined in a more general way, then a worker's previous labor market experi­
ence becomes important which rules out the possibility that labor market 
histories can be de~cribed by a SMP or a MP on a reasonably parsimonious 
state space. 
The following restriction on function ~ is imposed: 
AI: ~(.) is a non-decreasing bounded measurable function of t l . 
Thus, given a base wage rate, seniority, as defined, does not decrease the 
wage faced. Given the caveats mentioned above, Al is probably a close 
approximation of what happens in real world labor markets. 
At any moment in time a worker will choose to occupy a state based on 
prevailing conditions. From time-to-time, however, the situation faced 
chan~es and may lead to a change in state. Below two types of events are 

•

modelled; wage events (when new job offers are received) and layoff events 
(when employed workers are terminated and forced to become unemployed). 
The arrival rate of new job offers, and hence a new wage rate, is 
assumed to be a function of the state currently occupied. In particular, 
9 
let Ai denote the arrival rate of a new job offer when state i is 
occupied, where A. is the parameter of a Poisson process. Thus, 
1 
denotes the probability a new job offer is received in a small period of 
time h when state i is currently occupied. No a priori restriction is 
placed on the relative size of Al and A2 . In some occupations, such as 
lighthouse keeping, the arrival rate of new job offers when employed is 
likely to be small, whereas academics typically find it difficult to look 
for a job when unemployed. 
Suppose a wage rate event occurs when an individual is currently 
occupying state i. The new base wage rate faced is envisaged to be the 
realization of a known random variable. Let Fi(e;y) denote this distri­
bution when state i is occupied and y indicates the previous wage rate 
faced. The distribution function Fi(e;y) has compact support for all y. 
To simplify the analysis, assume 
for all y and y where F. has a compact support.
1 
Thus, the wage faced before a wage event is assumed to play no role in 
determining the new base wage rate faced. 6 We should note that when A2 is 
satisfied a worker employed at base wage y loses the possibility of return 
-to y after a wage event occurs. Hence, the base wage of an employed 
worker can increase or decrease through time. 
The arrival rate of a layoff obviously depends on the state currently 
occupied as it is zero when unemployed. Further, the arrival rate of 
layo~fs may depend on seniority (in the sense defined above). Typ~cally, it 
6The wage distribution from which an individual samples clearly depends 
on his fixed characteristics z. If the vector of characteristics are 
captured in some index of human capital, then one can envisage that workers 
with higher human capital draw from some rightward translation of the 
distribution F. 
A2: 
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is argued the probability of being laid off decreases with the duration of 
an employment spell. To allow for this, let ~(tl) denote the arrival rate 
of a layoff at time tl since last unemployed and assume 
A3: p(.) is a non-increasing function of tl' 
This assumption appears to agree with empirical evidence. For mathematical 
convenience, assume a laid off worker initially faces a wage rate of zero, 
This harmless technical restriction guarantees a laid off worker will act as 
if he prefers unemployment after a layoff.] 
The unemployment insurance (UI) payments paid to the unemployed worker 
may depend on the duration of the current spell. Let u(t ) denote the UI2
flow to a worker who has been unemployed for time t2 in a spell. Through­
out, u(·) is assumed to be bounded and piece-wise continuous and 
differentiable. Three alternative assumptions can be used. 
A4: The UI function u(·) is a non-increasing (bounded measurable) 
function of t 2 . 
A4': The UI function u(t2) - u, a constant, for all t 2 . 
A4": The UI function is a strictly increasing (bounded measurable) 
function of t2' 
In many countries the UI system is such that A4 is satisfied. In the 
United States, for example, UI payments are typically terminated if the 
duration of a spell of unemployment exceeds 26 weeks, The UI system in a 
few countries-will satisfy A4', Low paid workers in Britain, for.example, 
get the same payment per period indep<endent of the duration of unemployment, 
We know of no UI system which satisfies A4", 
11 

An unemployed worker faces the parameters F2 (e) and A2 , whereas the 
employed individual faces Fl(e), Al and u. Typically ~ and Ai' i 
1,2 are assumed to be independen~ of i; elements of the vector z are 
assumed to translate the mean of the dist'ribution functions F (e) in ai 
predictable way. ,Such complexities, although important, play no role in 
what follows. 
As the framework described above is more general than that usually 
considered in the job search literature, the standard method of analysis is 
not immediately applicable. Later a different solution method is outlined. 
In the next section, however, the individuals are assumed to restrict them­
selves to "event strategies". An individual will be said to follow an event 
strategy if changes in state only take place immediately after an event, but 
of course, not necessarily after every event. 
III. Event Strategies 
Suppose an individual has been employed for a spell of length t1 and 
currently faces a base wage rate y. Let Ul(y,t ) denote this individ­l 
ual's maximum expected discounted lifetime income given an event strategy is 
followed. Similarly, let U (u,t ) denote an individual's expected2 2
discounted lifetime income when he has been unemployed for time t2 in the 
current spell and only event strategies are considered. Given the model 
specified in the previous section, it follows from standard techniques that7 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
7See Sharma (1987). 
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where r is the discount factor, Ui denotes the derivative with respect 
to and where 
tl(t l ) - f Max{Ul (e,t l ),U2(u,O)} dFl(e) 
t (t ) - f Max{Ul (e,O),U (u,t )} dF (e) (3.3)2 2 2 2 2
The immediate implications of the above construction are stated in the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3.1: Suppose the individual utilizes the event strategy which 
yields the greatest expected discounted lifetime income (henceforth referred 
to as the best event strategy) and AI-A3 hold. Then, 
(i) if A4 or A4' hold: 
(a) Ul is strictly increasing in y and nondecreasing in tl 
(b) U2 is decreasing in t 2 · 
(ii) If A4" holds: 
(a) Ul is strictly increasing in y and nondecreasing in tl 
(b) U2 is strictly increasing in t 2 · 
Proof: It follows from (3.1) and AI-A3 that U is strictly increasing inl 
y and nondecreasing in tl if any versions of A4 hold. Further, from 
(3.2) it can be easily shown that U decreases, is a constant, or2 
increases with t2 as A4, A4' or A4" hold respectively. 
Proposition 3.1 implies if any version of A4 holds, the optimal 
strategy over all event strategies can be completely described by two 
functions, R{(t ) and R (t ). These two functions act as gene~lizedl 2 2
versions of a reservation wage, a concept used in most, if not all, studies 
on job search. The precise role of these two functions is summarized below. 
III 
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PROPOSITION 3,2: Suppose the individual utilizes the best event strategy 
and AI-A3 and any version of A4 holds, then 
>(i) 	 (a) as y <:: Rl(t l ) 
>(b) as y < R (t	 )2 2
(ii) If A4 or A4' hold: 
(a) R1 is a non-increasing function 	of t 1 , 
(b) R2 is a non-increasing function 	of t 2 , 
(iii) If A4" holds 
(a) is a non-increasing function 	of t 1 ,R1 
(b) is an increasing function of t 2 ,R2 
Proof: The existence of R (t ) follows as U (y,t ) increases with y,1 1 1 1
whereas U (u,O) is independent of y. Further, as U (y,t ) is a non­2 1 1
decreasing function of t 1 , R (t ) is a non-increasing function of t 1 .1 1
The existence of R (t ) is established in a similar fashion as U1(y,O)2 2
increases with y and U (u,t ) is not influenced by y. From Proposition2 2
3.1 it now follows that R (t ) increases with t2 if A4" holds whereas2 2
R2 (t2) is non-increasing in t2 when A4 or A4' holds. 
The above result is illustrated by Figure 1, The expected return to 
employment at three different base wage rates is indicated by U (y' ,t ),1 1
U(y", t ) and U(y·, t ) where y' > y" > y., As U is independent of1 1 2 
t l , it follows that y' - R1(ti), y" - R2(ti) and y. - R(ti) where t' < 
t" < t·, Thus, for example, if the individual has been employed for less 
than~time t" - in the current spell when base wage y" is offereq then the 
offer is rejected and unemployment is the preferred state. 
A consequence of Proposition 3.1 is that when the best event strategy 
is used, given any of the above sets of restrictions, an individual's labor 
III 
F/CiURE 1 

VI , U:1 
U2. 
I 
I 
r 
I 
r I 
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market history can be described by a SMP or a MP, The details are presented 
in the following claim which follows from the earlier propositions. 
PROPOSITION 3,3: Suppose Al-A3 hold and the individual utilizes the best 
event strategy, Then, 
(i) 	 if any version of A4 holds, the individual's labor market history can 
be described by a continuous time two-state SMpS whose hazard rates 
can be written as 
(3.5) 

(3,6) 
(ii) If A4 or A4' hold 
(a) ITI is a non-increasing function of tl 
(b) n2 is a non-increasing function of t 2 , 
(iii) If A4- holds 
(a) nl is a non-increasing function of tl 
(b) n2 is a strictly decreasing function of t2' 
SNote that assumption set Al-A4(A4') gives 
limittl~ Fl[Rl(tl )] > 0 and limitt2~ {1-F2 [R2(t2)]} > 0 
This implies that the individual will continue to change states forever, 
i.e., neither of the states is an absorbing state. Hence, the distribution 
function describing the completed spells in state i will be a proper 
distribution function. 
Let v 	 - (vl ,v ) denote the stationary probability vector of "the2
embedded Markov cha~n. Let ~l' ~2 be the expected duration in states 1 
and 2, respectively. Then, (by Theorem in Heyman and Sobel, p. 327), the 
limiting or stationary probabilities of the semi-Markov process defined are: 
• '1 -	 vl~1/[vl~1+v2~2]' '2 - v2~2/[vl~1+v2~2]' 
The interpretation of '1 and' is that if the individual is observed 
over a fairly long time, one woula expect him to be unemployed '2 propor­
tion of the time and employed for 'I proportion of the time, Alternative­
ly, 9 can be thought of as the expected proportion of a large number ofihomogeneous workers who will be in state i, in the long run. Under this 
interpretation '2 can be regarded as the "natural" rate of unemployment 
for the particular group of workers. 
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To complete this section, restrictions are imposed which guarantee the 
individual's labor market history can be described by a MP. Intuitively, we 
require conditions such that the expected return to being in a particular 
state is independent of the duration in that state. 
PROPOSITION 3.4: Suppose the individual utilizes the best event strategy. 
If Al-A3, A4' hold with the added restrictions 
(i) ~(tl) - ~ (a constant) for all tIt (3.7) 
and 
(3.8) 
then an individual's labor market history can be described aby continuous 
time two-state HP. Further, the transition rates are given by 
(3.9) 

(3.10) 

where for all and 
Proof: The assumptions made guarantee that the value functions Ui , i­
1,2 do not depend on the time spent in a state during the current spell. 
Thus Ri are independent of the duration of a spell in a particular state. 
Also, since Rl(O) - R (0) the result follows from (3.5) and (3.6)2
The above analysis shows that the structure of the two-state .tMarkov" 
model is very simple. In each state the optimizing individual uses a 
rese:vation wage strategy, and the resulting hazard rate besides depending 
9 
on the state itself may depend on the duration in that state. 
9If employed workers are allowed the option of keeping their current 
wage when a wage "shock" occurs, an individual's labor market history is 
still a SMP. The structure of the process is however different from that 
previously obtained. Each wage level constitutes a separate state 
III 
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IV. Optimal Stratelies 
The results obtained in the previous section were based on the 
restriction that an individual only considered event strategies. The pur­
pose of this section is to investigate when such a strategy can be 
guaranteed to be the one which maximizes expected discounted lifetime 
income. This is of interest because we will show that when an event 
strategy is optimal the individual's transitions between states can be 
represented by a SMP or a MP on a reasonably simple state space. If the 
best event strategy is not optimal within a broader class of strategies such 
a representation may not be possible. In fact we show below that for an 
important class of popularly used models this is in fact the case. 
To achieve the above goal it is shown that two stopping time functions 
can describe the strategy used by an income maximizing individual. This is 
achieved in an Appendix. In particular, the objective is to construct 
V (y,t ), the maximum expected discounted income given base wage y and1 1
t1 the duration in the current employment spell, and V (y,t ) the maximum2 2
expected discounted income given unemployment insurance system specified by 
u and t2 the length of the current unemployment spell. Of course these 
value functions need not exist. The following proposition states the 
conditions under which these value functions are well-defined. 
PROpoSITION 4.1: Given A1, A2, A3, A4' or A4" hold 
(ii)~ is-a non-decreasing function of t. , i - 1,2.
1 
(employment now being defined as a continuum of wage states). Also, only 
individuals who are laid off leave employment. 
17 

(iii) Vl(e,tl ) is a strictly increasing function of y if Vl(y,tl ) > 
V2(u,O). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Two implications of the above claims are stated in the following 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4,2: (i) Given AI, A2, A3 and A4' or A4" hold, an event 
strategy yields the maximum expected discounted lifetime income and 
thus an individual's labor market history can be described by a two-
state SHP such that the hazard rate out of either state decrease with 
duration. 
(ii) 	 Given Al, A2, A3 and A4' hold with (3.7) and (3.8) being satisfied, an 
event strategy yields the maximum expected discounted lifetime inc~me 
and thus the individual's labor market history can be described by a 
two-state HP with hazard rates given by (3.9) and (3.10). 
Proof: Suppose Vl(y,t l ) ~ V (y,O) for some y and t l . Proposition2
for t' > t This guaranteesI l' 
that an individual utilizing an income maximizing strategy will only leave 
employment immediately after an event (but not necessarily after every 
event). A similar argument establishes that such an individual will only 
leave unemployment immediately after an event (but not necessarily 'after 
every event). The claims made now follow from Proposition 3.3. 
For the rest of this section we assume that AI-A4 hold. Fureher, to 
focus on essentials we assume (3.7) and (3.8) hold. Not imposing (3.7) and 
(3.8) merely complicates the analysis (without offering any additional 
insights) and does not alter the general conclusions. 
III 
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Suppose the individual has been unemployed for time t~ when a new 
wage offer y is received. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2. 
From the claims made in Proposition 3.1 it is clear that by following the 
best event strategy this offer should be accepted only if t~ > t(y). As 
illustrated in Figure 2 a "high" wage offer y. is always accepted because 
Ul(y·) > U (t ) for all t2 ~ O. Similar reasoning establishes that "low"2 2
wage offer y' will always be rejected. 
We now enlarge the strategy space of the individual. Specifically, 
suppose the worker can accept wage offer y for a short period of time, € 
and then return to unemployment. By following this plan the worker "re­
initializes" the UI payment flow as u(O) [greater than u(t ), for t2 >2
0] is received initially when returning to unemployment. For € small 
enough, but still strictly positive, it is not difficult to imagine this 
option yielding a greater expected return than any event strategy. 
To formaiize the above intuition, suppose wage offer y is received 
when unemployed and the following three options are considered by the 
individual: 
(a) 	 Accept the offer and remain employed at least until the next event 

(wage or layoff event). 

(b) 	 Reject the offer and remain unemployed at least' until the next wage 

offer is received. 

(c) 	 Accept offer y but return to unemployment after time €, unless an 
event occurs first. If a wage event occurs accept it until an event 
occurs or·until the current employment duration is €. If a layoff 
event occurs first, return to unemployment. 
Given the above options, the strategy which yields the maximum expected 
discounted lifetime income will be termed the Temporary-employment strategy. 
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We will denote it by TE(f) where f indicates the minimum planned length 
of such employment. It should be stressed that the time interval f is not 
lO 
a choice variable but taken as a given parameter of the decision framework. 
We can interpret the above enlargement of the strategy space as 
allowing the worker to engage in "temporary" employment. The individual 
holds the temporary job as long as it takes to become eligible for unemploy­
ment insurance. Most UI systems require that a worker be employed for a 
certain length of time before he becomes eligible for UI payments. In this 
sense, f is fixed and taken to be an institutional constraint. Of course, 
while holding a "temporary" job an individual receives other job offers and 
may transit into a "permanent" job or another "temporary" job. If fired 
from a temporary job after an employment spell of less than f, whether he 
receives UI payments again depends on the UI system. 
Let Dl(y,f) denote the maximum expected return to employment at wage 
y. The expected return to unemployment when the TE(E)-strategy is used and 
t2 is the current duration of the spell is indicated by D2(u,t2 ,f). 
Finally, Q(y,f,T) denotes the expected return to option (c) above, when 
wage y is faced and the duration in employment is T(Sf). 
Utilizing techniques used in Section III it follows that 
(4.1) 

where ~l(y,f) - I Max{Dl (e,f),D2(u,O,e)}dF (e)l 
[u(t2) + A2~2(u,t2,e) + D2(u,t2 ,f)] 
D2(u,t2 ,f) - r + A2 (4.2) 
lONote when an individual uses an TE(e)-strategy he is not restricted to 
changing state immediately after an event. He can if he so chooses, leave a 
state at anytime. Also, note that an event strategy is a TE(f)-strategy. 
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where ~2(u,t2'€) - f Max{D l (e,€),D2(u,t2),Q(e,e,O)}dF2(e) and D' is the2 
derivative with respect to t 2 . Further, 
11 
[y + ~D2(u,t2'0) + Al~3(y!(,T) + Q'(y,e,T)] 
Q(y,f,T) ­
(4.3) 
It is clear from the enlarged strategy space used above, that the 
expected return to a TE(f)-strategy (for any given (> 0) is at least as 
great as when any event strategy is used. The next proposition states that 
if the given € is small enough the TE(€)-strategy dominates all event 
strategies. 
PROPOSITION 4.3: Given Al-A4 hold with (3.7) and (3.8) being satisfied, for 
small enough £ (£>0), the TE(£)-strategy yields a strictly greater 
expected discounted lifetime income than an event strategy. 
Proof: From (4.3) it follows that by making the given £ small enough we 
can make Q(y,€,T) as close as we like to D (u,0,£). Further, D (u,0,£)2 2
t!: U (u,O), where U (u,O) is defined by (3.2). From (4.1) and (4.2) it2 2
can be seen that D (u,O,£) is a non-increasing function of the given £ . 2
The claim made now follows as U (u,t ) < U (u,0) for t2 > 0 from A.4.2 2 2
III 
~ It shoul~ be noted that there exists a TE(f)-strategy for every given 
€ and the expected return to a TE(€)-strategy is greater the smaller is f. 
llNote we assume that if an individual is fired from a "temporary" job 
he receives UI payments but that he will not be eligible if he voluntarily 
leaves a job with current employment duration of less than f. 
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This, of course, implies that there does not exist a "best" TE(f)-strategy 
for all (> O. Nevertheless, as shown in Proposition 4.3 for ( small 
enough the expected return is greater than with all event strategies. 
Suppose for a given e, the TE(e)-strategy dominates all event 
strategies. In this case an unemployed worker's strategy can be described 
by two functions, R (t ) and R (t ). In particular, if the worker has2l 2 22 2
been unemployed for time t2 and is then offered wage w, he will 
(a) reject the offer if w < R2l (t2) 
(b) accept the offer for at most time e, if R2l (t2) ~ w < R22 (t2), 
where R2l (t2) < R22 (t2). 
(c) accept the offer at least until the next event if w ~ R22 (t2). 
If the TE(f)-strategy does not strictly dominate all event strategies 
R2l (t2) - R22 (t2) - R2(t2)· 
The next Proposition states that an individual's labor market history 
cannot be described by a two-state SMP if a TE(e)-strategy is used. 
PROPOSITION 4.4: For given E, if the TE(E)-strategy strictly dominates an 
event strategy, then an individual's labor market history cannot be 
described by a continuous time two-state SMP. 
Proof: As shown above, given a TE(E)-strategy strictly dominates an event 
strategy, there exists a set of wage offers which will be accepted .for at 
most time E and a set of wages which will be accepted at least until the 
next event. It is now straightforward to show that the transition rate out 
of employment·depends on the wage currently faced, and thus a two~tate SMP 
cannot describe the individual's labor market history. 
In the job search literature several authors have presented conditions 
which guaranteed a declining reservation wage with the duration of a spell 
III 
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of unemployment [see, for example, Burdett (1979)]. The reason for this 
result is that it is assumed an individual does not leave the state of 
employment after entering it. Once it is recognized that individuals can 
move between states the declining reservation wage result disappears. This 
also demonstrates the dangers associated with considering only the flow from 
one state to another and ignoring the direct or indirect feedback. 
Assumptions Al-A4 guaranteed that the expected return to unemployment 
strictly declines with the duration of a spell when an event strategy is 
used. This, in turn, implied there exists a TE(E)-strategy for € > 0 
which yields a greater expected return. This argument is general in the 
following sense. If assumptions are made which guarantee the expected 
return to unemployment declines with the duration of a spell when an event 
strategy is used, then there exists a TE«()-strategy for some (> 0 which 
yields a strictly greater expected return. 
To illustrate the above claim suppose a "scarring" model is briefly 
considered. Suppose Al-A4 are used when (3.7) and (3.8) are assumed to 
hold. As shown in Proposition (3.4), under this set of assumptions the 
expected return to unemployment does not change with the duration of a 
spell. Now assume the arrival rate of wage offers, A2 , is not a constant, 
as previously assumed, but declines with the duration of a spell of unem­
ployment. Hence, the longer the duration of a spell of unemployment the 
less likely an offer is received. It is straightforward to demonstrate that 
such a model implies the expected return to unemployment declines with 
I 
duration and also obtain a declining reservation wage result. However, by 
accepting a job for a reasonably short period of time and then returning to 
unemployment a worker can obtain an expected return greater than from any 
event strategy, i.e., there exists a TE«()-strategy for some € > 0 which 
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strictly dominates any event strategy. 
All along we have been treating employment and unemployment as single 
states. Clearly, in order to examine the flows within each state we need to 
expand the state space. To take account of heterogeneity among the 
unemployed, one could identify an individual as being in a different state 
depending on the number of past unemployment spells. The hazard rate 
besides being different for each unemployment state could also depend on the 
12duration in that state. Each employment state could be a particular kind 
of job or set of jobs. Realistically, each job should be characterized by a 
base wage, expected wage growth on the job and a layoff rate. However, 
given these dimensions for describing a job the search strategy of the 
individual becomes impossible to derive. It depends in a complicated manner 
on the current job as well as the pattern of wage growth on alternative 
jobs. Moreover, with such a general description of jobs there seems to be 
no parsimonious state space on which an individual's labor market history 
can be described. 
Conclusions 
Labor turnover is a probabilistic phenomenon and its study requires a 
theoretical and empirical framework in which the role of uncertainty is 
explicit. The models presented in this paper were set in an intertemporal 
decision framework with imperfect information, and the individuals movements 
between labor market states viewed as the realization of a (hopefully 
empfrically t~actable) stochastic process. These simple models p~rmit a 
"structural" interpretation of labor market histories and can be used for 
12Note that UI payments, given some maximum and m1n1mum constraints, 
depend on some index of past earnings. This adds to the possible 
heterogeneity among the unemployed. See Welch (1977). 
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analyzing continuous time duration data. 
The paper made explicit the assumptions underlying the various models 
considered and specified the state space on which the individual's labor 
market history could be described as a Markov or semi-Markov process. It 
was shown that relaxing some of the assumptions could lead to defining a new 
(enlarged) state space or losing the Markovian nature of the stochastic 
process describing the individuals labor market history. 
The main point has been to illustrate that the characterization of the 
optimal strategy and the implied stochastic process describing an individ­
ual's movements between labor market states may not be robust to changes in 
assumptions, that certain institutional features of the labor market may be 
difficult to model in a dynamic context, and that an empirical researcher 
(given available data) should clearly specify the state space and the nature 
of the stochastic process implied by the theoretical model he has in mind 
before conducting an analysis of labor market flows. All models impose a 
special structure on labor market transitions and the estimates of 
parameters must be seen in this light. 
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APPENDIX 
In this Appendix it is shown that a set of stopping rules, one for each 
state, can describe the income maximizing strategy of an individual in the 
framework considered. The method of proof is similar to that elaborated in 
Heyman and Sobel (1984). [See the book for references on Contraction 
Mappings and Markov Decision Processes.] 
Suppose an individual has occupied state i for time ti in the 
current spell and faces base wage Yo' if employed. If unemployed, Yo 
can be thought of as the last wage offer received. Any particular future to 
be faced by the individual can be described by a sequence of double tons 
th
where Yk denotes the base wage rate to be faced immediately after the k 
th
event occurs, and ~ then indicates the time from now until the k event. 
Let (O,P) be the measure space of all such sequences where P denotes the 
Bo~el sets of o. 
The probability measure generating any particular future depends on the 
states chosen by the individual in the future. For the moment assume the 
individual under consideration plans to stay in state i (the current 
state) forever. Now, let Mi(·;YO,t ) denote the probability measurei 
associated with possible futures given state i is occupied forever. 
Although not formally attempted here, it is reasonably straightforward to 
show~ that Ml~·;YO,tl) is constructed from Fl (·), Al and ~(t) whereas 
M (·;YO,t ) is generated by F (·) and A2 . The immediate consequences of2 2 2
this construction are summarized below. 
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ClAIM 1: (i) H2(B;YO,t2) - H2(B;YO,ti) for all t 2 , t'2 and B E fl· 
(ii) If JJ(tl ) is a constant for all tl ~ 0, then Ml(B;YO,tl ) -
Ml(B;YO,ti) for all t l , t'1 and B E p. 
(iii) If JJ(tl ) is strictly decreasing for all tl ~ 0, then HI ( • ; yo' tl ) 
is such that Pr[w-O] decreases with k. 
Claim l(i) above follows because F (.) and A2 are ir.dependent of2 
the duration of unemployment. Given JJ ( • ) is a constant, claim l(ii) 
follows since Fl(·,Y) and Al do not depend on the length of an employ­
ment spell. Further, if JJ(t ) is decreasing in t l , the probability thatl 
the kth event is a layoff decreases with k. 
The two probability measures constructed above are based on the 
restriction that the individual does not change state. Nevertheless, these 
two measures can be used to investigate when the individual should change 
state. In each state an individual chooses a strategy for changing state 
which can be described by a stopping time function T.: 0 ..... IR, i 1,2.
1. 
Any stopping time function satisfies the following restrictions: 
(i) Ti(w) ~ 0 for all w E 0, and 
(ii) if wand w' have the same first k elements and Ti(w) ~ ~, 
then Ti(w) - Ti(w') for all w,w' E O. 
Note (ii) above implies that any strategy used depends only on what has been 
observed and the probability laws generating the future, but not knowledge 
of the future. Let ~ denote the set of all functions T.(w). The 
1. 
individual chooses the stopping rules Ti(w), i - 1,2 to maximize expected 
discounted lifetime income. 
Let r denote the expected discounted income given the individual isi 
currently in state i, the stopping rule T. is used and then optimal
1. 
decisions are taken in the future. It follows that 
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(A.l) 
where 
k-l a j +l 
1 1(W'YO,t1 ,T1) - ~ J 

j-O a
j 
(A.2) 
where ~ ~ Tl(w) ~ ~+l' r is the discount rate and is defined byV2 
V2(y,t2) - MAX r 2(y,t2 ,T2) (A.3) T2~ 
assuming the maximum exists. Similarly, 
where 
Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.1 the stopping rules T. are well 
1 
defined [see DeGroot (1970), Elfving (1967)]. Many others have studied 
simi{ar quest~ons in different frameworks, see Chow and Robbins (1961), 
McCall (1965), MacQueen and Miller (1960), and Mortensen (1986). Also, the 
value functions V and V are bounded measurable functions. It isl 2 
straightforward now to use the method in Sharma (1987) to show that the 
value functions exist and are unique. 
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